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The present study examined whether a temporary activation of independent or
interdependent self-construals by priming has an inﬂuence on cooperation in social
dilemmas. It was expected that individuals primed with independence would be
primarily concerned with their own outcomes, whereas individuals primed with
interdependence would also be concerned with the outcomes of their interaction
partner. The former should therefore exhibit lower levels of cooperation.
Additionally, the inﬂuence of social value orientation on cooperation was measured.
Participants played 32 rounds of a give-some dilemma with an alleged interaction
partner. As predicted, participants primed with independence exhibited lower levels
of cooperation than participants primed with interdependence. Results are discussed
in terms of their signiﬁcance for research on self-construals and social dilemmas.
Research on independent vs. interdependent self-construals has become a prominent
topic in social psychology. Initially, diﬀerences between cultures were studied. More
recent studies have shown that diﬀerent self-construals may also be activated
temporarily, for example by priming (e.g., Gardner, Gabriel, & Lee, 1999; Ku¨hnen &
Hannover, 2000). Most of these studies focused on the impact of self-construals on
well-being, cognition, attribution style, family obligation, etc. (cf. Oyserman, Coon,
& Kemmelmeier, 2002). The current study aims to extend this research to the
behavioral domain by studying the eﬀects of salient self-construal on behavior in an
interdependence situation, more speciﬁcally, cooperative behavior in a social
dilemma. Based on Interdependence Theory (Kelley & Thibaut, 1978), it is assumed
that activation of a speciﬁc self-construal leads to a transformation of motives, which
aﬀects the level of cooperation.
Independent vs. Interdependent Self Construals
Cultural psychology has identiﬁed the extent to which the self is deﬁned in relation to
others as a key variable distinguishing between members of Western and Eastern
cultures. In Western (independent, individualistic) cultures, people perceive
themselves as unique and independent from others. The self is deﬁned mainly in
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terms of internal attributes such as abilities and attitudes (e.g., Markus & Kitayama,
1991), and the uniqueness of the self is valued highly. In Eastern (interdependent,
collectivistic) cultures, people perceive themselves as connected to others, to a much
greater degree the self is deﬁned in terms of group memberships, relationships to
family and friends as well as social roles. Similarities with others and common goals
are therefore more important than in individualistic cultures.
The diﬀerences between individuals with an independent self-construal and
individuals with an interdependent self-construal have been extensively studied by
comparing people from diﬀerent cultures (cf. Fiske, Kitayama, Markus, & Nisbett,
1998). However, this method potentially confounds diﬀerences in self-construals
with various other variables diﬀering between the cultures (Oyserman et al., 2002).
Therefore, researchers have started to manipulate the salience of independent vs.
interdependent self-construals, for example by primes (Gardner et al., 1999;
Haberstroh, Oyserman, Schwarz, Ku¨hnen, & Ji, 2002; Ku¨hnen & Hannover, 2000;
Ku¨hnen, Hannover, & Schubert, 2001; Traﬁmow, Triandis, & Goto, 1991).
These studies on chronically or temporarily activated independent vs. inter-
dependent self-construals have shown that individuals with an activated inter-
dependent self-construal are more attentive to the (social) context in general. For
example, their thinking is more context-bounded (Ku¨hnen et al., 2001), and they are
more responsive to conversational or social norms (Gardner et al., 1999; Haberstroh
et al., 2002).
However, most of these studies used questionnaire data as dependent measures,
but did not assess behavior in social interactions. An exception is a study by
Gardner, Gabriel, and Hochschild (2002), in which independent and interdependent
self-construals were primed and predictions from self-evaluation maintenance theory
(SEM; Tesser, 1988) were tested. SEM proposes that when a close other performs
well on a relevant task this threatens self-esteem. Consequently, people tend to react
negatively to successes by close others on relevant tasks. However, Gardner et al.
(2002) showed that successes of a friend became causes for celebration rather than
costs to self-esteem if interdependent self-construals were primed.
One goal of the present study is to extend research on activating independent vs.
interdependent self-construals to the domain of social interactions, more speciﬁcally,
cooperation in social dilemmas. In social dilemmas, individual and collective interests
are in conﬂict (Dawes, 1980). That is, individuals obtain higher outcomes if they
pursue their individual interests than if they pursue the collective interest, and, at the
same time, if all members pursue their individual interests the group members obtain
lower outcomes than they would when they all pursue the collective interest. Such
conﬂicts between individual and collective interest underlie many situations in
everyday life. Examining behavior in social dilemmas is therefore not only of
theoretical interest, but also of practical relevance. Moreover, the activation of an
independent vs. an interdependent self-construal can be expected to play a central
role in these situations because taking into account the social context, that is, the
interests of the interaction partners, corresponds to a focus on the collective interest
and should therefore result in higher levels of cooperation than focusing mainly on
one’s own outcome (individual interest).
The inﬂuence of self-construal on cooperation in social dilemmas has rarely been
studied till now. Parks and Vu (1994) reported higher levels of cooperation for
Vietnamese in comparison to American participants in resource dilemmas as well as
in public-good dilemmas. Participants believed they were playing against another
participant, but in fact played 30 rounds against preprogrammed strategies (tit-for-
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tat and variations of tit-for-tat). In Study 2, one of these preprogrammed strategies
was ALL-D (100% competition). Vietnamese participants exhibited not only higher
levels of cooperation than the American participants, but also showed a cooperation
rate of 63% (vs. 27% for the Americans), even against the ever-defecting interaction
partner. Hemesath and Pomponio (1998) found higher levels of cooperation for
Chinese vs. American participants in a prisoner’s dilemma. Other authors argue that
the ingroup – outgroup distinction is more important in collectivistic cultures than in
individualistic cultures. Therefore, higher levels of cooperation with ingroup
members, but lower levels of cooperation with outgroup members should be
expected for people from collectivistic cultures in comparison to people from
individualistic cultures (e.g., Iyengar, Lepper, & Ross, 1999; Leung & Iwawaki,
1988; Yamagishi, 1988). In all there is not much research, and even that is only
cross-cultural, and it remains unclear whether diﬀerent self-construals are really the
cause for higher levels of cooperation in Eastern cultures.
In the present study, salience of self-construals was manipulated experimentally
by priming. It was expected that levels of cooperation would be higher when an
interdependent self-construal was activated than when an independent self-construal
was activated. Additionally, the study aimed to examine the underlying process.
Based on interdependence theory, it was assumed that diﬀerent self-construals lead
to diﬀerent transformations of motivation, which in turn aﬀect levels of
cooperation.
Interdependence Theory
Kelley and Thibaut (1978) proposed the transformation of motivation as an
underlying mechanism to explain why people do not always behave in a selﬁsh
way. They assume that the presented outcome structure of a given task, the given
matrix of an individual, is transformed into the so-called eﬀective matrix, which
determines the actual behavior. Whereas the given matrix represents preferences
based on pure self-interest, the eﬀective matrix represents the inﬂuence of broader
goals such as emotional reactions, cognitive interpretations, individual disposi-
tions, relationship macromotives, or social roles and norms (cf. Rusbult & Van
Lange, 1996).
In the context of social dilemmas, the inﬂuence of one dispositional variable on
outcome transformation has been extensively studied: social value orientations.
Social value orientations are relatively stable preferences for certain distributions of
outcomes between self and other (Messick & McClintock, 1968; Van Lange, Otten,
De Bruin, & Joireman, 1997). Most people can be classiﬁed as either prosocial,
individualist, or competitor. Prosocials strive to maximize joint outcome, that is,
they transform the given matrix into an eﬀective matrix consisting of the sums of
their own and the other’s outcome. At the same time, they are also motivated to
maintain equality of outcomes (Van Lange, 1999). Individualists are primarily
motivated to maximize their own outcome in an absolute sense; therefore, no
transformation of the given matrix takes place. Competitors aim to maximize the
diﬀerence between their own and the other’s outcome, their eﬀective matrix
consequently represents the diﬀerence scores. Because individualists and competi-
tors are both concerned primarily with own outcome, either in absolute or relative
terms, these two groups are often referred to as proselfs. Evidence for the assumed
underlying transformation processes is reported in several studies (e.g., Dehue,
McClintock, & Liebrand, 1993; McClintock & Liebrand, 1988).
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In a similar vein, it can be argued that the activation of independent vs.
interdependent self-construals inﬂuences the interpretation of a social dilemma
situation and in turn the level of cooperation. It is hypothesized that individuals with
an independent self-construal are primarily focused on their own, individual interest,
that is, they should pursue an individualistic motivation. Individuals with an
interdependent self-construal should take the interests of the interaction partner into
account. Therefore, it is expected that people with salient interdependent self-
construals exhibit higher levels of cooperation than individuals with salient
independent self-construals.
In the present research, the inﬂuence of temporarily activated self-construals on
cooperation is contrasted with the inﬂuence of the chronically salient social value
orientations. This allows testing of whether the eﬀects of priming and social value
orientation combine additively or in an interactive way. Based on research on
priming eﬀects on person perception it can be assumed that inﬂuences from
chronically (social value orientation) and temporarily (priming) activated concepts
are additive (Bargh, Bond, Lombardi, & Tota, 1986). However, from research on the
eﬀects of social identiﬁcation on cooperative behavior the hypothesis can be derived
that the eﬀects are stronger for proselfs. De Cremer and Van Vugt (1999) found
evidence for the so-called goal-transformation hypothesis. This hypothesis states
that the manipulation of social identiﬁcation aﬀects especially proselfs by inducing
them to assign a greater value to the collective interest. Because prosocials assign a
high value to the collective interest chronically, social identiﬁcation does not lead to
a large increase in cooperation rates. If one assumes that independent self-construals
are chronically salient in individualistic cultures, it can be expected that activating
interdependent self-construals has a larger impact on proselfs.
Method
Participants and design. Ninety-one psychology students (16 males, 75 females) of
Chemnitz University of Technology participated in the experiment. Mean age of the
participants was 22 years. Participants received course credit for participation and
had the chance to win one of ten extra prizes of 10 e (about $10). The experiment had
a 3 (social value orientation: prosocial vs. individualistic vs. competitive) 6 2
(priming: independence vs. interdependence) between-participants design. Block of
trials was analyzed as a within-participant variable.
Materials and procedure. Upon arrival for a study examining ‘‘decision making in
social interactions’’, each participant was seated behind a personal computer. The
computers were separated by screens to prevent visual contact. All tasks were run on
the computer. First, the social value orientation of the participant was assessed with
the Triple Dominance Measure of Social Value Orientation (Van Lange et al., 1997).
This measure consists of nine decomposed games, in which participants have to
make a choice each time between three diﬀerent distributions of outcomes for
themselves and the other, representing a prosocial, individualistic, or competitive
social value orientation. If the participant made six or more choices consistent with
one social value orientation, he/she was classiﬁed accordingly. Twenty-one
participants could be classiﬁed as prosocials, 33 as individualists, and 21 as
competitors. Sixteen participants did not make six or more consistent choices and
were excluded from further analyses.
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After a ﬁller task, the social dilemma was explained (see below). Ten questions
checked whether participants suﬃciently understood the dilemma. Three partici-
pants were later excluded because they answered less than eight questions correctly.
When the computer ostensibly started to connect the participant to another
participant, a problem message was displayed. This message stated that at this time
not all of the other participants had completed all the questionnaires and
instructions, and that they would therefore ﬁrst complete another task. This task
was the priming manipulation (see below). After the priming task, participants
played 32 rounds of the social dilemma. Lastly, participants completed a post-
experimental questionnaire. Participants were asked to write down their e-mail
address on a separate list. Debrieﬁng took place via e-mail after the data collecting
for the experiment was completed. The winners of the extra prizes were also
informed via e-mail.
Priming. Participants had to unscramble 18 scrambled sentences. Thirteen
sentences were primes, the rest were ﬁllers. The sentences were similar to the ones
used by Ku¨hnen and Hannover (2000). In the independence priming condition, the
primes contained words such as individual, self-contained, or independent, whereas in
the interdependence priming condition prime words were for example group,
friendships, or together.
Give-some dilemma. Participants played 32 rounds of a four-coin give-some
dilemma, ostensibly with another participant. In the beginning of each round, each
player had four coins, worth 1 e to him/herself, but 2 e to the other person.
Participants were told that the amount of money was hypothetical, but that they
could improve their chances of winning an extra bonus of 10 e by earning more
‘‘money’’. Thus, although hypothetical, the amount of money earned was relevant
to the participants (for an identical procedure see Van Lange & Visser, 1999). (In the
actual raﬄe, held after the experiment was completed, each participant had an equal
chance of winning one of the bonuses.)
The participant then had to decide how many (0, 1, 2, 3, or 4) of his/her four
coins he/she wanted to give to the other person. Similarly, the other person was
supposed to decide how many of his/her four coins he/she wanted to give to the
participant. The exchange of coins was then displayed on the computer screen. Then
a new round started. The interaction partner was in fact preprogrammed. Mean
cooperation of the interaction partner as well as cooperation in the ﬁrst round was
giving two coins. Within each of the eight blocks of four trials, the other gave two
times two coins and one time one or three coins. Order within these four trials was
randomized.
Dependent measures. The ﬁrst dependent measure was actual cooperation in the
dilemma game, that is the number of coins given in every round. It could also be
argued that participants primed with interdependence do not enhance cooperation
levels in general, but match their responses closer to the cooperation level of their
interaction partner (= greater context sensitivity). Therefore, as an additional
measure, the absolute values of the diﬀerences between participants’ level of
cooperation and cooperation of the alleged interaction partner in the round before
were computed, and these 31 scores were averaged (a=.87). A lower score on this
measure is an indicator of a stronger intent to pursue a tit-for-tat strategy. To
examine their interpretation of the dilemma situation, participants were also asked
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to indicate the extent to which they had pursued diﬀerent goals while making the
choices (e.g., ‘‘I wanted as many coins as possible for myself’’, ‘‘I wanted the same
number of coins for me and the other’’). The following goals were presented:
maximizing one’s own gain (MaxOwn), maximizing relative gain (MaxRel),
maximizing equality respectively minimizing the diﬀerence between one’s own and
the other’s gain (MinDiﬀ), maximizing joint gain (MaxJoint) and maximizing the
other’s gain (MaxOther). Answers were given on a seven-point scale.
Checks. Several questions checked for potential awareness of the priming
manipulation. Participants were asked what they thought was the goal of the
experiment and whether they felt that one of the earlier tasks inﬂuenced their
decisions in the dilemma game. If they felt inﬂuenced, they should specify which task
and in what way. Participants were also asked whether they had already participated
in a similar experiment. Nine participants were excluded because they had experience
with priming experiments and felt somehow inﬂuenced by the scrambled sentences
task.1 Thus, the ﬁnal sample consisted of 19 prosocials, 25 individualists, and 19
competitors. Cell sizes ranged from 9 to 16.
Results
Cooperation. Mean cooperation was analyzed by a 3 (social value orientation:
prosocial vs. individualistic vs. competitive) 6 2 (priming: independence vs.
interdependence) 6 8 (block) analysis of variance with repeated measures on the
last factor. This analysis yielded three signiﬁcant main eﬀects. The main eﬀect of
social value orientation, F(2, 57)=11.46, p 5 .001, indicated that prosocials
exhibited the highest level of cooperation (M=1.98), followed by individualists
(M=1.59) and competitors (M=1.22), ps 5 .05, Bonferroni. More important is
the main eﬀect of priming, F(1, 57)=4.12, p 5 .05. Participants primed with
interdependence (M=1.72) showed higher levels of cooperation than did
participants primed with independence (M=1.47). The main eﬀect of block, F(7,
399)=2.66, p 5 .05, was due to a drop of cooperation after the ﬁrst block (Means
for Blocks 1 through 8 were 1.82, 1.60, 1.63, 1.59, 1.45, 1.55, 1.51, and 1.60). No
interaction eﬀect was signiﬁcant, all Fs 5 1.12, ps 4 .34.
Analyzing the diﬀerence score by means of a 3 (social value orientation) 6 2
(priming) analysis of variance revealed a signiﬁcant main eﬀect of social value
orientation, F(2, 57)=9.86, p 5 .01. Prosocials diﬀered less from their interaction
partner’s level of cooperation (M=0.74) than did individualists (M=1.03) or
competitors (M=1.17), p 5 .05, Bonferroni. The latter two groups did not diﬀer
signiﬁcantly from each other. The main eﬀect of priming was not signiﬁcant, F(1,
57)=2.07, p=.16. However, the interaction between priming and social value
orientation was signiﬁcant, F(2, 57)=3.21, p 5 .05. Tests for simple main eﬀects
revealed that only competitors matched their responses closer to their interaction
partner’s level of cooperation when primed with interdependent self-construals
(M=0.97) than when primed with independent self-construals (M=1.38), F(1,
57)=8.09, p5 .01. The eﬀects for prosocials (Ms=0.76 vs. 0.72, respectively) and
individualists (Ms=1.04 vs. 1.02, respectively) were not signiﬁcant, both Fs 5 1.2
Self-reported goals. Eﬀects of priming and social value orientation on self-reported
goals were analyzed by a multivariate analysis of variance. This analysis revealed a
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signiﬁcant main eﬀect of social value orientation, F(2, 57)=3.23, p 5 .001, and a
marginally signiﬁcant main eﬀect of priming, F(1, 57)=1.98, p 5 .10. To further
scrutinize these eﬀects, a series of univariate analyses of variance were conducted.
For all four goals, these analyses revealed signiﬁcant main eﬀects of social value
orientation, F(2, 57)=10.47, 14.6, 11.99, 14.44, p 5 .001, for MaxOwn, MaxRel,
MinDiﬀ and MaxJoint, respectively, and 3.69, p 5 .05 for MaxOther. The means
are displayed in Table 1. The pattern was consistent and as expected: Prosocials
were less motivated to maximize own and relative gain, but more motivated to
minimize the diﬀerence, maximize joint gain and others’ gain than individualists and
in-turn competitors did.
More interesting, for MaxOwn and MaxOther signiﬁcant main eﬀects of priming
occurred. Participants primed with interdependence (M=4.19) were less concerned
with maximizing their own gain than participants primed with independence
(M=5.16), F(1, 57)=6.58, p 5 .05. Participants in the interdependence priming
condition (M=3.30) were also more willing to maximize the gain of their respective
interaction partner than participants in the independence priming condition
(M=2.37), F(1, 57)=5.29, p5 .05. No other eﬀects were signiﬁcant, all Fs5 2.25.
Comparing the relative value assigned to MaxOwn and MaxOther in the
interdependence and independence conditions revealed that participants in the
interdependent self-construal condition were about equally concerned with
maximizing their own and maximizing the other’s gain as indicated by the non-
signiﬁcant diﬀerence between MaxOwn and MaxOther (Ms=4.19 vs. 3.30, a
diﬀerence of M=0.89, t(26)=1.47, ns.). Individuals in the independent self-
construal condition on the other hand were much more concerned with maximizing
their own than the other’s outcome (Ms=5.16 vs. 2.37, a diﬀerence of M=2.79,
t(35)=7.34, p 5 .001).
To test whether the eﬀects of priming on MaxOwn and MaxOther mediated the
eﬀects of priming on cooperation, several regression analyses were conducted.
According to Baron and Kenny (1986), three regression analyses have to be
conducted to test for mediation. First, the mediator is regressed on the independent
variable. Second, the dependent variable is regressed on the independent variable.
Third, the dependent variable is regressed on both, the independent variable and the
mediator. Mediation is established if the independent variable aﬀects both, the
mediator (regression 1) as well as the dependent variable (regression 2), and if the
eﬀect of the independent variable on the dependent variable is no longer signiﬁcant
TABLE 1 Self-reported Goals as a Function of Social Value Orientation
Social value orientation
Goal Prosocial Individualistic Competitive
MaxOwn 3.63a (1.89) 4.72ab (1.59) 5.79b (0.98)
MinDiﬀ 6.05a (1.18) 4.32b (2.01) 3.26b (2.02)
MaxRel 1.84a (1.07) 3.08a (1.93) 4.84b (1.93)
MaxOther 3.53a (1.74) 2.68ab (1.75) 2.16b (1.21)
MaxJoint 6.47a (0.77) 4.96b (1.97) 3.47c (2.04)
Note. Answers were given on seven-point scales (1= not at all, 7= very much). Within each
row, means with different subscripts differ signiﬁcantly at p5 .05 by Bonferroni alpha-
protected comparisons.
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when the mediator is included in the regression analysis (regression 3), whereas the
mediator exerts a signiﬁcant eﬀect on the dependent variable.
These three regression analyses were conducted separately for MaxOwn and
MaxOther. However, because of the large main eﬀects of social value orientation on
the goals, these analyses simultaneously controlled for social value orientation and
the interaction terms. Including categorical variables in regression analyses aﬀords
contrast coding (Judd, 2000). Social value orientation was decomposed in two
contrasts: Prosocials vs. individualists and competitors (= proselfs; 2 – 1 – 1) and
individualists vs. competitors (0 1 – 1; see Judd, 2000, for details). To make the
analyses more comprehensible, only the betas important for the mediation analysis
are reported in the text, but not the theoretically less interesting eﬀects of social value
orientation.3
Regressing MaxOwn on priming—controlling simultaneously for social value
orientation and the interactions terms—resulted in a signiﬁcant eﬀect of priming (the
independent variable) on MaxOwn (the mediator), b=– .28, t (57)=– 2.57,
p5 .05, R2= .28, F(5, 57)=5.84, p 5 .001 (see Figure 1). Thus, criterion one was
met. The regression of mean cooperation on priming, social value orientation and
the interaction terms resembled the eﬀects already known from the analysis of
variance. As required by criterion two, priming exerted a signiﬁcant eﬀect on
cooperation, b=.22, t (57)=2.03, p 5 .05, R2= .27, F(5, 57)=5.54, p 5 .001.
When MaxOwn was entered in the regression, the main eﬀect of priming was no
longer signiﬁcant, b=.12, t(56)=1.07, ns., whereas MaxOwn still exerted a
signiﬁcant eﬀect, b=– .38, t(56)=– 3.06, p 5 .01, R2= .36, F(6, 56)=6.86,
p5 .001. The indirect eﬀect of priming on cooperation was also signiﬁcant,
t(56)=4.07, p5 .001 (Sobel, 1982). Thus, the eﬀect of priming on cooperation is
mediated by MaxOwn.
The same analysis was conducted for MaxOther (see Figure 2). The regression of
MaxOther on priming, social value orientation and the interaction terms revealed a
Maximize own gain
–.28* –.38**
CooperationPriming(1 independent,
2 interdependent) (.22*) .12 ns.
FIGURE 1 Path diagram (controlling for social value orientation and the
interaction terms) of the eﬀect of priming on mean cooperation by way of goal to
maximize own outcome (MaxOwn). Note: Coeﬃcients are standardized regression
weights. *p 5 .05; **p 5 .01.
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main eﬀect of priming, b=.28, t(57)=2.30, p 5 .05, R2= .12, F(5, 57)=2.62,
p5 .05. Regression 2 (cooperation on priming) has already been reported in the
analysis for MaxOwn. The eﬀect of priming on cooperation, b=.22, t(57)=2.03,
p5 .05 was no longer signiﬁcant when MaxOther was included in the regression
analysis, b=.14, t(56)=1.30, ns., whereas the eﬀect of MaxOther was, b=.29,
t(56)=2.49, p 5 .05, R2= .33, F(6, 56)=6.07, p 5 .001. The indirect eﬀect of
priming on cooperation via MaxOther was also signiﬁcant, t(56)=3.71, p 5 .001
(Sobel, 1982). Thus, for both goals, the eﬀect of priming was no longer signiﬁcant
when goals were entered in the regression analyses, indicating that the eﬀect of
priming on cooperation is mediated by the goals MaxOwn and MaxOther.
It might also be of interest to compare the inﬂuence of MaxOwn with the
inﬂuence of MaxOther. If both goals were entered simultaneously in the regression
analysis, MaxOwn had a beta of b=– .35, t(55)=– 2.85, p 5 .01, whereas
MaxOther had a beta of b=.25, t(55)=2.25, p 5 .05.
Discussion
The present research examined whether the temporary activation of independent vs.
interdependent self-construals by priming has an eﬀect on cooperative behavior in a
social dilemma. Prior research on self-construals was thereby extended to behavior
in interdependence situations. Based on interdependence theory it was assumed that
individuals with an activated interdependent self-construal would focus not
primarily on their own, but also on others’ outcomes and therefore show higher
levels of cooperation than individuals with an activated interdependent self-
construal.
As expected, participants primed with interdependent self-construals showed
higher levels of cooperation than individuals primed with independent self-
construals. Competitors primed with interdependent self-construals were also more
Maximize other’s
gain
.28* .29*
Priming
(1 independent,
2 interdependent)
Cooperation
(.22*) .14 ns.
FIGURE 2 Path diagram (controlling for social value orientation and the
interaction terms) of the eﬀect of priming on mean cooperation by way of goal to
maximize the other’s outcome (MaxOther). Note: Coeﬃcients are standardized
regression weights. *p 5 .05.
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responsive to the behavior of the interaction partner than when primed with
independent self-construals. There was also a main eﬀect of social value orientation.
Prosocials exhibited higher levels of cooperation than individualists, followed (lastly)
by competitors. Interestingly, the two eﬀects were additive when the actual level of
cooperation was used as a dependent variable, but combined in an interactive way
when matching behavior was the dependent variable. This indicates that there are
two processes at work. Priming interdependent self-construals primarily induces
people to enhance levels of cooperation in general. However, competitors try to
match their behavior closer to their interaction partner’s behavior when primed with
interdependent self-construals. This pattern corresponds to the goal-transformation
hypothesis: competitors, the subgroup that usually maximizes the diﬀerence between
own and other’s outcome and is therefore least inclined to match the behavior of the
interaction partner, transform their goals when interdependent self-construals are
activated.
There was no interaction involving block of trials. This indicates that the priming
eﬀect is relatively stable—at least over 32 rounds. It is not the case that the activation
of a self-construal has an inﬂuence on cooperation in the ﬁrst round only, when no
information about a partner’s behavior is given and the situation is therefore
somewhat ambiguous.
More important, the priming manipulation also had an eﬀect on self-reported
goals. Participants in the interdependence priming condition said they were less
concerned with their own outcome and more concerned with the other’s outcome,
than did participants in the independence priming condition. This eﬀect is in line
with the greater sensitivity for (social) context reported in other studies (Gardner et
al., 1999; Haberstroh et al., 2002; Ku¨hnen et al., 2001).
The eﬀects of priming on goals mediated the priming eﬀect on cooperative
behavior. That is, the activation of a speciﬁc self-construal altered the relative
importance of one’s own and the other’s outcomes, which in turn inﬂuenced the
behavior in the dilemma game. This explanation is in line with interdependence
theory (Kelley & Thibaut, 1978). Individuals with an activated interdependent self-
construal transform the given matrix into an eﬀective matrix by assigning more
importance to the other’s outcome and less importance to their own outcome than
individuals do with an activated independent self-construal. Although similar
processes have been shown for people with diﬀerent social value orientations
(McClintock & Liebrand, 1988; Van Lange, 1999), this interpretation remains
somewhat problematic because the goals were assessed in retrospect after the
dilemma was played.4 However, assessing the goals before playing the dilemma
would have evoked an even higher demand character to behave consistently with the
prior indicated goals. Future research is needed to further examine the validity of
this interpretation.
An alternative explanation for the ﬁndings is that the priming activated rather
diﬀerent norms of cooperation justiﬁed in impersonal versus more interpersonal
situations than independent versus interdependent self-construals. The present study
did not include measures of self-construal, however, there is evidence from a study
by Ku¨hnen and Hannover (2000) that similar scrambled sentences aﬀect perceived
self – other similarity which cannot simply be explained by norms. Moreover, the two
interpretations do not exclude each other. According to the semantic-procedural
interface model of the self (Ku¨hnen et al., 2001) the activation of the interdependent
self renders associated semantic content areas such as social norms or concern with
the expectations of interaction partners salient and activates simultaneously a more
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context-bound way of thinking. The present study is a ﬁrst step to show that primes
used to activate independent and interdependent self-construals in other studies
assessing more cognitive dependent measures (Ku¨hnen & Hannover, 2000) also
aﬀect cooperative behavior in social interactions.
Strengths and Limitations
One strength of the current study lies in the fact that it manipulated the activation of
self-construals experimentally rather than comparing people from individualistic
cultures with people from collectivistic cultures. Thus, the study provides evidence
that the activation of aspects of independent vs. interdependent self-construals
causes diﬀerences in levels of cooperative behavior. Moreover, the present study
tried to explain the underlying processes by assessing self-reported goals. The
identical dilemma situation elicited diﬀerent goals depending on whether an
independent or an interdependent self-construal was activated. This provides at least
some evidence that self-construals inﬂuence the transformation of motivation
processes.
Second, the inﬂuence of independent vs. interdependent self-construals was
studied in an interdependence situation. People were actively ‘‘involved’’ in a social
dilemma and received immediate feedback on their actions from the alleged
interaction partner. Most prior studies have examined indicators of social
information processing or at-best behavior in hypothetic scenarios, but have not
investigated situations in which one’s own outcome was aﬀected by the actions of an
interaction partner. Whereas the dilemma game might seem somewhat artiﬁcial at
ﬁrst sight, it represents a conﬂict between individual and collective interest that also
underlies many situations in everyday life. For example, in relationships one often
has to choose whether or not to forego a pleasant activity that is not appreciated by
one’s partner. In work settings, it might be more pleasant not to invest too much
time and eﬀort in a group task, but if every team member acts this way, the group is
worse oﬀ. It can therefore be expected that diﬀerences in self-construal also aﬀect
behavior in many real-life situations.
Another strength lies in the fact that social value orientations were controlled. In
cross-cultural studies on cooperation in social dilemmas, social value orientations
have not been assessed, thus, the possibility remains that there is a higher proportion
of prosocials in collectivistic cultures. Moreover, the assessment of social value
orientation allows for the comparison of the inﬂuence of chronically and
temporarily activated variables. The eﬀect of social value orientation was not
overridden by the priming manipulation. Chronically and temporarily activated
concepts combined additively to guide cooperative behavior (for similar ﬁndings in
the domain of person perception see Bargh et al., 1986). When matching behavior
was used as dependent variable, in keeping with the goal-transformation hypothesis
(De Cremer & Van Vugt, 1999), the eﬀects for competitors were stronger than the
ones for individualists and prosocials.
Before closing, I should note some limitations of the current research. First, the
current design did not include a control condition. Therefore, it remains unclear
whether the priming of the interdependent self-construal makes people behave more
cooperatively, priming of the independent self-construal makes people behave more
competitively, or both. It could be argued that an independent self-construal is
chronically activated in individualistic countries like Germany. In a similar vein
Gardner et al. (1999) argue for American individuals. Future research is needed to
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examine this question. The present research has a least shown that there are eﬀects of
a relatively subtle priming manipulation over and above personal dispositions such
as social value orientation.
Another limitation might be that participants did not interact with another
participant in the current study; instead, they played against a computer. This
procedure was chosen because holding cooperation of the interaction partner
constant over diﬀerent conditions allows tracing back diﬀerences in behavior to
social value orientation and the priming manipulation. Nevertheless, it would be
interesting to study the eﬀects of diﬀerent self-construals on cooperative behavior in
real interactions in future studies.
To conclude, the present study is a ﬁrst step in examining the eﬀects of diﬀerent
self-construals on behavior in interdependent situations, more speciﬁcally, on
cooperation in social dilemmas. The present results showed that activating aspects of
independent versus interdependent self-construals by priming leads to diﬀerent levels
of cooperation. Moreover, there is some preliminary evidence that independent vs.
interdependent self-construals lead to diﬀerent transformations of motivation, which
in turn inﬂuence levels of cooperation.
Notes
1. The pattern of results remained the same when these subjects were included (Ms=1.69 and
1.49 for the interdependent and independent self-construal priming condition), but the
main eﬀect for priming was no longer signiﬁcant, F(1, 67)=2.36, p=.13. This is in line
with research showing that awareness of a prime results in contrast rather than assimilation
eﬀects (Strack, Schwarz, Bless, Ku¨bler & Wa¨nke, 1993).
2. Although the two dependent measures (number of coins given and the diﬀerence score) are
correlated, r(63)=– .74, the diﬀerent patterns of results indicate that they capture diﬀerent
aspects of cooperative behavior.
3. Regressing MaxOwn on priming, social value orientation and the interactions terms
resulted also in signiﬁcant eﬀects of the two social value orientation contrasts, bs=– .44,
and – .27, ts(57)=– 4.00, and – 2.44, ps5 .05 for the contrast prosocials vs. proselfs, and
the contrast individualists vs. competitors, respectively. The regression of mean
cooperation on priming, social value orientation and the interaction terms revealed also
eﬀects of the two social value orientation contrasts, bs= .47, and .27, ts(57)=4.23, and
2.46, ps 5 .05 for the contrast prosocials vs. proselfs, and the contrast individualists vs.
competitors, respectively. When MaxOwn was entered in the regression, the contrast
between individualists and competitors was no longer signiﬁcant, b=.17, t(56)=1.57, ns.
The contrast between prosocials and proselfs remained signiﬁcant, b=.30, t(56)=2.57,
p5 .05. This indicates that the diﬀerence between individualists and competitors is mainly
due to diﬀerences in the weight assumed to own outcome.
The regression of MaxOther on priming, social value orientation and the interaction
terms revealed only a signiﬁcant contrast between prosocials and proselfs, b=.30,
t(57)=2.52, p 5 .05. However, social value orientation still had a signiﬁcant inﬂuence on
cooperation, bs= .38 and .23, ts(56)=3.41 and 3.16, p 5 .01 and p 5 .05, for prosocials
vs. proselfs and individualists vs. competitors, respectively.
4. Mean cooperation hardly mediates the eﬀects of priming on MaxOwn or MaxOther. The
priming eﬀect decreases only slightly, but is still marginally signiﬁcant, both bs= .20,
ts(56)=1.86 and 1.67, ps 5 .05, for MaxOwn and MaxOther, respectively.
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